Fordham Law Review
Volume 84

Issue 6

Article 9

2016

The Social Boundaries of Corporate Taxation
Sloan G. Speck
University of Colorado Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sloan G. Speck, The Social Boundaries of Corporate Taxation, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 2583 (2016).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol84/iss6/9

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

THE SOCIAL BOUNDARIES
OF CORPORATE TAXATION
Sloan G. Speck*
INTRODUCTION
The United States employs a classical system of corporate taxation in
which income earned through certain domestic business entities—
“corporations” for tax purposes—is subject to taxation once at the entity
level and again when distributed to the entity’s owners. By contrast,
income earned through other business entities—“conduits” for tax
purposes—is taxable directly to the entity’s owners and not taxable at the
entity level.1 The differential treatment of corporations and conduits places
tremendous pressure on how corporations are defined under the Internal
Revenue Code2 (“the Code”). Not surprisingly, taxpayers and their
advisors generally have taken an instrumental approach to the
corporate/conduit distinction under the Code, seeking their preferred tax
status while limiting adverse nontax consequences.3
Historically, the tax law distinction between corporate and conduit
treatment drew primarily on doctrinal understandings, treating state-law
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. Thanks to Lynn Stout
and the other participants in the Fordham Law Review symposium entitled We Are What We
Tax; participants in the University of Colorado Business Law Colloquium; and Ari
Glogower, Kathryn Goldfarb, David Hasen, and Cathy Hwang for helpful comments. For an
overview of the symposium, see Mary Louise Fellows, Grace Heinecke & Linda Sugin,
Foreword: We Are What We Tax, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2413 (2016).
1. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of Corporate and
Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction, 84 TAX NOTES 1767, 1767–68 (1999). Not all
corporate income faces two distinct levels of tax; for example, corporate income paid to taxexempt debtholders faces tax neither at the entity level nor when paid. Id. at 1768. In
addition, entity-level taxes may function as withholding or anti-deferral mechanisms with
respect to shareholders, rather than distinct levies. See STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO
SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT 83–84
(2010) (describing the corporate tax between 1913 and World War I as “a complementary,
rather than separate, tax”). Finally, neither corporate nor conduit treatment is systematically
favored, and taxpayers may prefer different classifications depending on their specific
circumstances. See BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 2.01[2], Westlaw (database updated May 2015).
These qualifications do not detract from—and perhaps increase—the pressure on
distinguishing corporations and conduits.
2. The basic statutory definitions are contained in I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1)–(3) (2012). A
significant body of law—statutory, administrative, and judicial—elaborates these categories.
3. See 1 WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS ¶ 3.06[1], Westlaw (database updated May 2015).

2583

2584

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

corporations as corporate for tax purposes and classifying unincorporated
legal entities based on their resemblance to conventional state-law
corporations. More recently, commentators and the U.S. Department of
Treasury (“Treasury”) have abandoned these doctrinal touchstones in favor
of efficiency, broadly construed, as the guiding principle in determining an
entity’s tax classification.4 In part, this shift reflects conventional critiques
of classical corporate taxation, which focus on the ways in which entitylevel taxes burden taxpayers’ choices, including the choice of entity under
state corporate law, beyond the labor/leisure and saving/spending tradeoffs
that underlie income taxation. Alleviating the tax system’s pressure on
these choices advances efficiency, the argument goes.5 More broadly, this
shift in perspectives on corporate tax classification mirrors a larger turn in
academic and policy circles, rooted in the 1970s, toward efficiency as a
controlling metric for evaluating legal rules.6
This Article argues that, while important, efficiency considerations
should not function as the sole arbiter of the boundary between corporate
and conduit tax treatment. First, classical corporate taxation is, in many
ways, deeply embedded within a larger network of legal and social
meanings.7 Classical corporate taxation operates in concert with, rather
than separately from, these legal and social meanings. For this reason, the
rules governing entities’ tax classification should take these
interrelationships into account, if not as a primary norm, then as a
secondary consideration when empirical or other uncertainties preclude a
clear choice based on efficiency.8 The social boundaries of corporate
taxation refer to the extent to which these types of nontax considerations
implicate the Code’s structural distinction between corporations and
conduits.9 Second, efficiency is often conceptually tractable as a metric,
but this intuitive appeal can mask significant empirical uncertainties about
4. See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1627–28 (1999).
5. See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 27–28 (2009). In a
world that recognizes legal entities, some of these efficiency costs may be unavoidable. See
David A. Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes: Theory and
Doctrine in the Corporate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 215, 224–29 (2007).
6. See Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations
Drive Out Inequities?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 736–37 (1979).
7. The legal and social implications of taxation have long been acknowledged. See,
e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 520 (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., 2014) (“[A] tax is always more than just a tax: it is also a way of defining norms and
categories and imposing a legal framework on economic activity.”).
8. More typical are claims that tax law should operate independently from other areas
of law. See, e.g., Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and
International Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1251–52 (2008) (arguing that
tax and corporate law should be severed with respect to entities’ country of residence).
9. Weisbach acknowledges that policymakers may consider “goals other than
efficiency” in line drawing where the relevant law “attempts to change preferences.” See
Weisbach, supra note 4, at 1676 & n.177 (giving as examples the restrictions on the
deductibility of bribes and lobbying expenses, as well as the disparate tax consequences for
married and unmarried couples). Weisbach does not, however, contemplate that such other
goals are relevant to structural aspects of the Code such as the corporate/conduit distinction.
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behavioral responses, especially if policymakers possess limited
information, have difficulty reversing inapposite decisions, or face other
constraints.10 In these situations, policymakers should take cues from the
broader legal and social context in which tax law operates. Finally, by
claiming that corporate tax law is situated in broader legal and social
contexts, this Article does not attempt to validate or valorize the
independent merit of these other contexts. Instead, this Article advocates
consistency across policy areas—“fit” within the broader legal and social
framework—rather than particular policy prescriptions.11
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the evolution of the
basic rules governing corporate tax classification and the turn from doctrine
to efficiency in the evaluation of these rules. Part II brings historical
understandings of corporations in the United States into conversation with
current debates about corporate personhood and social responsibility. Part
III examines the boundaries of corporate tax classification through three
vignettes that explore special tax categories that complicate the
corporate/conduit distinction, namely small business corporations (“S
corporations”), real estate investment trusts (REITs), and domestic
corporations that have engaged in inversion transactions to shift their
corporate residence to a non-U.S. jurisdiction.
I. EFFICIENCY AND CORPORATE TAX CLASSIFICATION
The classification of legal entities for tax purposes presents a
paradigmatic line-drawing problem, one intrinsic to the structural choice to
impose a classical corporate tax. Under the reasonable assumption that
fundamental reform is impossible or unavailable to the policymakers
charged with drafting the legal rule,12 the task is clear: the rule must
10. See Bittker, supra note 6, at 746–48; see also Herwig J. Schlunk, Little Boxes: Can
Optimal Commodity Tax Methodology Save the Debt-Equity Distinction?, 80 TEX. L. REV.
859, 860–61 (2002) (outlining certain problems with applying “optimal commodity tax
methodology” to income taxation); Weisbach, supra note 4, at 1666–71 (discussing
informational and computational issues with determining the ex ante efficiency effects of
line drawing).
11. See Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94
GEO. L.J. 889, 946–47 (2006) (describing corporate taxation as a “pragmatic compromise”
that is not necessarily “the best or only means” to resolve the issue); cf. RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) (arguing that interpretations of legal rules must both “fit” and “justify”
a legitimate objective).
12. See David A. Weisbach, Thinking Outside the Little Boxes: A Response to Professor
Schlunk, 80 TEX. L. REV. 893, 895–97 (2002). Congress generally has relied on Treasury
and courts to give content to the statutory delineation between corporations and conduits. See
BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 1, ¶ 2.01[3]; see also Yehonatan Givati, Walking a Fine
Line: A Theory of Line Drawing in Tax Law, 34 VA. TAX REV. 469, 474–75 (2015)
(describing how Treasury should choose among instruments for line drawing). Fundamental
reform to eliminate the corporate/conduit distinction would face significant political hurdles
in Congress. See Heather M. Field, Checking in on “Check-the-Box”, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
451, 521–22 (2009) (arguing that, in the late 1990s, administrative rulemaking may have
alleviated any pressure Congress felt to enact more sweeping corporate tax reforms); see
also Schlunk, supra note 10, at 861–62 (advocating fundamental reform as a solution to linedrawing questions in the distinction between corporate debt and equity). While Treasury and
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categorize each relevant legal entity as either a corporation or a conduit for
tax purposes.13 The collective pool of legal entities, however, is diverse
and relatively continuous in its economic and legal characteristics. These
entities vary in, among other things, their ownership, management, capital
structure, and the transferability of their interests; their name, the powers
they possess under their charter and the law of the jurisdiction of their
organization, and the activities they actually conduct; and any limitations on
liability for owners or fiduciary duties imposed on managers.14
Policymakers must denote certain of these characteristics as legally salient
in order to parse these entities as either corporations or conduits for tax
purposes.
Changes in law, financial markets, and business practices have
complicated, and likely will continue to complicate, the calculus for
determining corporate classification under the Code. For example, the
advent of limited liability companies (LLCs) in the late 1970s, and their
widespread adoption by the mid-1990s, gave businesses an alternative to
state incorporation laws that preserved limited liability protections for all
owners while allowing significant flexibility in governance and ownership
structures.15 By the mid-2000s, this flexibility had been enhanced by a
number of public and private legal innovations, including state statutes
enabling “series” LLCs and automatic conversions among various entity
types.16 Series LLCs allow a single legal entity to designate multiple series
that are treated as separate and distinct from each other for liability
purposes.17 State-law conversion statutes permit entities to change their
type by filing a short certificate, enabling, for example, an LLC to convert
to a corporation, or vice versa.18 Both of these innovations challenge
conventional understandings of entities as having discrete, durable legal
personhood, and in each of these cases, Treasury issued guidance that was
relatively favorable to taxpayers by permitting LLCs to elect either
corporate or conduit treatment,19 treating each series in a series LLC as a
courts generally lack the power to engage in fundamental reform, the congressional political
process also substantially limits the practical availability of such reform through the
legislative process. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 40 NAT’L
TAX J. 357 (1987) (describing the idiosyncratic politics that resulted in the Tax Reform Act
of 1986). Even at the congressional level, policymakers face line-drawing problems much
more frequently than fundamental reform.
13. As discussed infra Part III.A and III.B, tax conduits are subject to several different
tax regimes.
14. See, e.g., BANK, supra note 1, at xi; LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE
UNCORPORATION 67–75 (2010).
15. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 14, at 119–23.
16. See id. at 146–47.
17. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(a)–(b) (2016). The extent to which liabilities
are “siloed” has not been tested extensively at state law. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 14, at
146–47.
18. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-214(a)–(b) (allowing conversions to Delaware
LLCs).
19. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06-082 (Nov. 18,
1980). For more detail, see Field, supra note 12, at 460–63.
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separate entity for tax purposes,20 and allowing state-law conversions to
qualify for tax-free treatment under conventional tax rules.21 Finally,
globalization has increased dramatically the number and variety of entities
whose tax classifications are relevant for U.S. tax purposes; domestic and
foreign multinationals may own subsidiary entities both inside and outside
the United States.22 Again, this change amplifies the number of variables in
play when drawing lines between corporations and conduits in the tax
system.
Before 1997, Treasury employed an approach to line drawing that looked
to doctrinal distinctions drawn from state corporate law. For entities
incorporated under state law, this fact was dispositive; such entities were
treated as corporations for tax purposes.23 In addition, after 1986, most
entities listed on a public stock exchange were taxable as corporations.24
By contrast, Treasury regulations classified unincorporated entities based
on their resemblance to a “pure corporation,” as measured by six “major
characteristics.”
Drawn from Morrissey v. Commissioner,25 these
characteristics included the existence of “associates” (roughly, joint
owners), the presence of an entity-level business objective, continuity of
life, centralization of management, limited liability, and free transferability
of ownership interests.26 Because all business entities had associates and an
entity-level business objective, the regulations deemed an unincorporated
entity a corporation for tax purposes if it possessed at least three of the
remaining four characteristics.27
Ultimately, Treasury’s doctrinal approach to line drawing failed to
delineate corporations from conduits in a meaningful way. Sophisticated
taxpayers, in consultation with their advisors and in reliance on legal
opinions, could manipulate the Morrissey factors to achieve their preferred
tax classification with limited changes to the underlying economic

20. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-03-004 (Jan. 18, 2008).
21. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2006); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2005-48-021 (Dec. 2, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-28-021 (July 15, 2005).
Furthermore, these changes occurred alongside an expansion in the use of other conduits,
such as S corporations. See infra Part III.A.
22. See BANK, supra note 1, at 261–64. In addition, that entities can be relevant in more
than one jurisdiction creates difficult-to-police arbitrage opportunities. See generally Gregg
D. Lemein & John D. McDonald, Final Code Sec. 894 Regulations: Treaty Benefits for
Hybrid Entity Payments, TAXES, Sept. 2000, at 5, 5–6 (hybrid entities); Gregg D. Lemein &
John D. McDonald, Proposed Regulations Regarding Domestic Reverse Hybrid Entities,
TAXES, May 2001, at 5, 7–8 (reverse hybrid entities).
23. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 1, ¶ 2.02[1] (discussing Morrissey v.
Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935)).
24. See I.R.C. § 7704 (2012).
25. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
26. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960) (revised 1997). The regulations were issued
in 1960 in response to the Internal Revenue Service’s loss in United States v. Kintner, 216
F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), and typically are referred to as the “Kintner regulations.”
27. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2)–(3) (1960).
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arrangement.28 By the mid-1990s, Treasury acknowledged that the
regulations’ “formalistic rules” allowed taxpayers to “achieve partnership
[that is, conduit] tax classification for a nonpublicly traded organization
that, in all meaningful respects, [was] virtually indistinguishable from a
[state-law] corporation.”29 For unincorporated entities, the choice between
corporate taxation and conduit taxation had become “effectively elective.”30
In late 1996, Treasury promulgated the “check-the-box” regulations,
which replaced the effectively elective Morrissey factors with a regime that
was explicitly elective with respect to unincorporated entities whose
interests were not readily tradable (so-called “eligible entities”).31 By
contrast, state-law corporations and similar enumerated entities (“per se
corporations”), as well as most publicly traded entities, could not choose to
be taxable as conduits.32 In addition, the check-the-box regulations
included complex default rules that Treasury claimed “generally would
match taxpayers’ expectations.”33 The check-the-box regulations were well
received by taxpayers and their advisors, and Treasury trumpeted its
approach as “much simpler” to implement by both public and private
actors.34
Subsequent commentators have addressed the effectiveness of the checkthe-box regulations by focusing on efficiency considerations, broadly
For this Article, the core efficiency consideration is
construed.35
deadweight loss, which describes the costs associated with private actors’
behavioral changes in response to a tax. These behavioral changes include
the substitution of less-taxed activities for more-taxed (but otherwise
preferred) activities, as well as the private costs of tax avoidance and
evasion—that is, the costs to engage in preferred (but otherwise taxed)
activities without paying the applicable tax.36 Efficiency considerations
also include public administrative costs, private compliance costs with
regard to reporting, and simplicity (which presumably lowers both public

28. See I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297 (noting that, under the pre-1997 regime,
“small unincorporated organizations may not have sufficient resources and expertise to apply
the current classification regulations to achieve the tax classification they desire”).
29. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -3, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989, 21,990 (May 13, 1996).
30. See SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 27–28, 52–54.
31. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2006).
32. See I.R.C. § 7704 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 2014).
33. T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215, 218.
34. Id. at 216; see also I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297.
35. See Joel Slemrod & Schlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration,
in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1423, 1447 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein
eds., 2002) (adopting “a broader concept of efficiency cost”).
36. One could exclude transfers among private actors, such as payments to lawyers and
accountants, from the category of deadweight loss because such transfers do not involve real
resource costs. See Raj Chetty, Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate
Deadweight Loss?: The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance, 1 AM. ECON. J.: ECON.
POL’Y 31, 32 (2009).

2016]

SOCIAL BOUNDARIES OF CORPORATE TAXATION

2589

and private administrative costs).37 The common thread in these efficiency
considerations is that they constitute the aggregate social cost of taxation.
Shortly after Treasury finalized the check-the-box regulations, David
Weisbach argued in favor of the type of reform that these regulations
represented. By “drop[ping] traditional doctrinal concerns and instead
focus[ing] on efficiency,” bad taxes could be replaced with better ones, and
any revenue loss or distributional effects could be remediated through
changes to the rate structure or transfer system.38 Treasury could maximize
efficiency by drawing the line between corporations and pass-through
entities to treat close economic substitutes the same while keeping tax rates
low for items with ready substitutes.39 In Weisbach’s analysis, the checkthe-box regulations accomplished this by classifying publicly traded entities
as corporations for tax purposes and allowing all other entities to migrate to
a pass-through regime.40 Although this statement is largely true, taxpayers
use entities classified as corporations for tax purposes in a variety of wellestablished situations outside of public markets, including in certain small
business arrangements and as leveraged blockers for investments in U.S.
real property by non-U.S. persons.41 In addition, the category of publicly
traded entities requires regulators to draw a second line, with the
consequence that some entities with highly liquid interests will fall outside
the corporate tax base and into the elective regime.42 For these reasons, the
line drawn by the check-the-box regulations is not entirely coextensive with
the efficient line Weisbach postulated.
Although subsequent commentators have taken a less-rosy view of the
check-the-box regulations, their critiques also focus on efficiency
considerations. Steven Dean, for example, argues that the simplicity-related
37. See Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal
Efficiency Cost of Funds, 43 IMF STAFF PAPERS 172, 173, 179–82 (1996) (including all of
these social costs when calculating the marginal efficiency cost of funds). For more on
social costs and efficiency considerations, see Leigh Osofsky, Who’s Naughty and Who’s
Nice?: Frictions, Screening, and Tax Law Design, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1057, 1063 nn.15–16
(2013).
38. Weisbach, supra note 4, at 1628–31 (“[W]hat is important about the check-the-box
regulations is that they drop traditional doctrinal concerns and instead focus on efficiency.”).
Weisbach also raises “traditional tax policy concerns,” such as conformity to the HaigSimons definition of economic income, as a possible (but flawed) basis for distinguishing
corporate and noncorporate entities for tax purposes. Id.
39. See id. at 1663–64 (discussing “substitution costs” and “direct costs” and applying
both concepts to entity classification).
40. Id. at 1628–31; see also David A. Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing
in the Tax Law, 29 J. LEGAL. STUD. 71, 71–73 (2000).
41. See COOLEY LLP & PROBITAS PARTNERS, U.S. REAL ESTATE FUNDS AND FIRPTA:
STRUCTURES TO MAXIMIZE NET RETURNS TO NON-U.S. INVESTORS 3–4, 5–7 (2014), https://
www.cooley.com/files/probitas_partners_cooley_FIRPTA_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/5UZEMXVN]; Barbara Weltman, 5 Reasons to Be a C Corporation, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.
(May 23, 2012), https://www.sba.gov/blogs/5-reasons-be-c-corporation [http://perma.cc/
2CVX-W9PU].
42. See Lee A. Sheppard, What Is Public Trading?, 67 TAX NOTES 443, 443 (1995)
(describing the definition of “publicly traded” as “a new front in the entity classification
wars”).
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benefits promised by Treasury in the 1990s never materialized. Instead, the
check-the-box regulations “deliver[ed] pro-taxpayer deregulation that
[caused] more of society’s resources to be devoted to paying, minimizing,
and collecting taxes”—all social costs that implicate efficiency
considerations.43 Similarly, Heather Field argues that, although the checkthe-box regulations simplified the law in some respects, eased certain
administrative and compliance burdens, and promoted neutrality with
respect to choice-of-entity considerations, the regulations also introduced
new areas of complexity and transaction costs.44 Significantly, the checkthe-box regulations facilitated increased planning and avoidance efforts by
taxpayers, often to achieve tax effects not related directly to the
corporate/conduit distinction.45 Field concludes that the check-the-box
regulations “represent an improvement over the [prior] regulations” but “are
far from a panacea.”46 The common thread for Weisbach, Dean, and Field
is that efficiency considerations drive the analysis and evaluation of entity
classification schemes under the Code.
II. THEORIZING CORPORATIONS
In evaluating the rules for classifying entities for tax purposes, an
orientation toward efficiency considerations obscures the broader legal and
social implications of the choice of whether to subject a business entity to
corporate taxation. Such an orientation treats the tax system as separate
from other legal regimes governing entities’ existence and activities, such
as state corporate law, and as distinct from broader understandings about
the role of business in society. This part first develops connections between
tax and nontax understandings of corporations, then addresses two potential
objections to deploying these understandings in tax policy.
A. Corporate Identity
Corporate law scholars have identified three principal theories of
corporate identity, which over time have exchanged positions of
prominence in academic, legal, and popular understandings of
corporations.47 First, the “artificial entity” theory holds that corporations,
43. See Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box
Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 466–67 (2005)
[hereinafter Dean, Attractive Complexity]; see also Steven A. Dean, Tax Deregulation, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 390 (2011).
44. See Field, supra note 12, at 471–78, 490.
45. See id. at 486–87.
46. See id. at 522. One way of reading Field’s argument is that the check-the-box
regulations radically democratized the entity classification process, removing certain aspects
of tax planning from social norms that previously constrained abuses. See generally TANINA
ROSTAIN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., CONFIDENCE GAMES: LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE
TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY (2014).
47. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate
Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L.
767, 772–813 (2005); Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate
Identity Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 891–97 (2012); Martin Petrin,
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as creatures of the state, are subject to unlimited regulation by the state,
including through taxation.
Second, the “aggregate” theory views
corporations as agglomerations of their owners or other stakeholders. In the
1970s, the law and economics movement drew on the aggregate theory to
describe the corporation as a “nexus of contracts” that coordinates
production using many independent actors. Similarly, the “lock-in” theory
of corporate identity, developed in the 2000s, contends that corporations’
distinguishing feature is their ability to credibly commit their owners’
capital to long-term investments without claim by those owners.48 Finally,
the “real entity” theory treats corporations as distinct legal persons with
specific rights and obligations not linked to those of their owners. Although
each of these theories explains some aspects of corporate law, the aggregate
and real entity theories have the most legal and social salience today.49
To some extent, these theories of corporate identity simply fail to map
onto tax scholarship, and tax scholars often argue that these theories
provide limited normative justification for the corporate tax. For example,
Reuven Avi-Yonah claims that none of the artificial entity, aggregate, or
real entity theories provides a clean justification for the corporate tax.50
More generally, tax scholars describe popular understandings that
corporations or other business entities bear the burden of, or ultimately pay,
the corporate tax as a “fiscal illusion.”51 Instead, natural persons bear the
burden of corporate taxes, and although some consensus exists that labor
and holders of capital share this burden at equilibrium, the precise
proportions of this allocation engender significant disagreement.52 For tax
scholars, corporations resemble neither “real” entities nor aggregates of
their direct constituents, and the true measure of the corporate tax (and
nearly all tax scholars take a dim view) requires understanding both its
incidence and efficiency costs.53 Corporate law and tax scholars diverge

Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm—From Nature to Function, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV.
1, 10–13, 33–42 (2013).
48. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 254–
55; see also Bank, supra note 11, at 892.
49. See Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1061–63 (1994).
50. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1197–212 (2004); see also Jennifer Arlen & Deborah
M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325, 331–32 (1995)
(discussing “populist” explanations of the durability of corporate taxation in the United
States).
51. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 50, at 1208–11.
52. See SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 61–62, 67–70 (discussing the “New Harberger”
model). Economists have done general equilibrium modeling and empirical work on
corporate tax incidence, and estimates of incidence vary significantly under both approaches.
See WILLIAM M. GENTRY, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS PAPER 101, A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
ON THE INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 4–6 (2007), https://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/ota101.pdf (analyzing the empirical data)
[http://perma.cc/UKB7-DNQQ]; Jennifer Gravelle, Corporate Tax Incidence: Review of
General Equilibrium Estimates and Analysis, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 185, 204–05, 211 (2013).
53. See Bank, supra note 11, at 896–97.
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fundamentally in how they debate the role of legal entities, and especially
corporations, in their respective fields.
The artificial entity, aggregate, and real entity theories of corporate
identity matter, however, in the sense that they have positive, and
potentially normative, value in state corporate and entity law. In turn, this
state law has significant historical linkages to the design of the corporate
tax. For example, Steven Bank argues that, in the early twentieth century,
the managers of state-law corporations accepted entity-level taxation as a
price to maintain corporations’ ability to retain earnings and credibly
commit capital, consistent with the lock-in theory of corporate identity.54
Although Bank acknowledges the (efficiency) costs of such a compromise
(and is agnostic about the (efficiency) value of lock-in for corporate law
purposes), his analysis illustrates that choices about the scope of corporate
taxation can interact, positively or negatively, with core principles in
corporate law.55 These interactions indicate that an approach to entity
classification based exclusively on line drawing and efficiency
considerations may fail to account for the broader legal context in which
corporate taxation operates.
B. Corporate Personhood and Social Responsibility
Not only is corporate taxation enmeshed with state laws governing
corporations and other entities, but it also is situated within broader social
understandings of corporate personhood, rights, and responsibilities. In the
tax academic literature, these social understandings suffer because they tend
to be diffuse, perhaps intrinsically so, and often stand at odds with a
rational, economically informed perspective on public policy.56 The recent
renaissance in judicial, academic, and popular engagement with the nature
of corporate personality indicates, however, that these social understandings
should not be dismissed as irrelevant to tax law and policy.57
At the heart of this recent renaissance lie two well-known Supreme Court
decisions—Citizens United v. FEC58 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,

54. See id. at 917–31; see also Arlen & Weiss, supra note 50, at 348–62 (discussing the
“retained earnings trap”).
55. See Bank, supra note 11, at 947.
56. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process As Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 57–
61 (1990) (arguing that, in terms of public opinion, “[r]ational ignorance is mixed with just
plain ignorance”).
57. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Nonprofits and Disclosure in the Wake of Citizens
United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 337, 337 (2011) (“Few campaign finance cases have drawn more
public attention than [Citizens United].”); Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128
HARV. L. REV. 154, 154–57 (2014) (describing public opinions about Hobby Lobby as
“divided” and “inflamed”); Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the
Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831, 863 (2013) (“Much
of the public backlash against Citizens United can be seen as a populist rejection of the idea
that corporations are merely associations of citizens.”).
58. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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Inc.59—both of which implicate policy choices about which types of entities
should be subject to corporate taxation. Citizens United invalidated
portions of the McCain-Feingold Act, as well as certain state laws, that
restricted corporate spending on “electioneering communications” in
Citizens United, a not-for-profit state-law
advance of elections.60
corporation, paid for advertising and distribution of a film criticizing
Hillary Clinton, who was running for the Democratic presidential
nomination in 2008.61 The Court held that, while such spending violated
the McCain-Feingold Act, the Act itself contravened Citizens United’s First
Amendment rights to free speech.62
Although Citizens United’s tax-exempt status did not figure prominently
into the Court’s opinion, taxation proved critical to the decision’s
subsequent effects.63 Citizens United was exempt from tax under section
501(c)(4) of the Code,64 one of several provisions under section 501(c) that
exempt entities from corporate taxation based on their organization and
purposes.65 In the wake of Citizens United, contributions to section
501(c)(4)-qualified groups increased dramatically.66 The decision had the
effect of linking tax status to a mode of political expression, both under the
law and in the popular imagination. In addition, an internal Treasury
review confirmed congressional suspicions that, after Citizens United, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had applied additional scrutiny to certain
conservative groups, among others, applying for tax-exempt status under
section 501(c)(4).67 Following these revelations, some viewed the tax
system as a partisan mechanism for contesting the Court’s extension of First
Amendment rights to state-law corporations.68 In these ways, Citizens
59. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
60. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 passim. Justice Kennedy wrote for a divided Court.
61. Id. at 319–20, 404–05.
62. Id. at 371–72.
63. Theories of corporate identity, however, played a role in the opinions, although
scholars debate the nature of that role. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the
Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1033; Alan Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby
Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are
RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 280–81 (2014); Padfield, supra note 57, at 843–
48; David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social
Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1217–18 (2011). For a brief
overview of historical understandings of corporate rights and identity, see Naomi Lamoreaux
& William Novak, Getting the History Right: Tracking the Real History of Corporate
Rights in American Constitutional Thought, SLATE (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/03/hobby_lobby_and_corporate_personhood_
here_s_the_real_history_of_corporate.html [http://perma.cc/9NVV-R2CW].
64. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 404.
65. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (2012).
66. See Briffault, supra note 57, at 337–38.
67. See TREAS. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED
TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW 5–6 (2013), https://www.treasury.gov/
tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf [http://perma.cc/P3WE-RQ4S].
68. For an overview of these events, see Frances R. Hill, Citizens United and Social
Welfare Organizations: The Tangled Relationships Among Guidance, Compliance, and
Enforcement, 43 STETSON L. REV. 539, 539–42 (2014).

2594

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

United highlights how tax law interplays with nontax questions about the
social role of corporate actors.
The Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby also had significant connections to
taxation. At stake were certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act of
2010 that required employers either to provide health care coverage to
employees that included costless access to contraceptives or to pay a
nondeductible “penalty” administered through the Code.69 The two
employers before the Court were corporations, each substantially owned by
a single family who objected, based on religious beliefs, to providing access
to contraceptives.70 Both employers also qualified as S corporations under
the Code, a conduit tax status available to certain closely held
corporations.71 Justice Alito, writing for the majority, held for these
employers, finding that the contraceptive mandate violated the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. Material to Justice Alito’s opinion was
the fact that the actions of these employers substantially aligned with the
beliefs of their owners.72 Indeed, this alignment of interests extends to
taxation, where the nondeductible penalty directly affected these owners’
tax liabilities.73 Like Citizens United, Hobby Lobby illustrates how tax and
substantive corporate powers are intertwined.
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby address the rights of corporations; the
obverse of these holdings involves understandings of corporations’ social
responsibilities. After (and notwithstanding) Milton Friedman’s famous
admonition that corporate managers have no duty other than to generate
profits for their shareholders,74 ideas of corporate social responsibility have
become prominent in business, academic, and popular discourses.75 Indeed,
in Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito noted that “modern corporate law does not
require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything
else, and many do not do so.”76 Writing in the wake of the social
movements of the 1950s and 1960s, Friedman explicitly juxtaposed
managerial spending on social causes with taxation, arguing that such
69. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014).
70. Id. at 2763–67.
71. See I.R.C. §§ 1363(a), 1366(a) (2012).
72. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774–75, 2785. For more discussion, see Brandon L.
Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 145–46 (2014).
73. See, e.g., Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes, and Religion: The Hobby Lobby
and Conestoga Contraceptive Cases, 65 S.C. L. REV. 1, 72–73 (2013).
74. See generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
75. Although the relationship between business and society has changed over time, the
postwar period ushered a new focus on the responsibilities of business to other stakeholders.
See, e.g., ELIZABETH A. FONES-WOLF, SELLING FREE ENTERPRISE: THE BUSINESS ASSAULT
ON LABOR AND LIBERALISM, 1945–60, at 5 (1994) (“[C]orporate leaders constructed and sold
a specific vision of the reciprocal relationship of businesses and citizens that stressed mutual
rights and responsibilities.”). Friedman wrote in the context of this new focus.
76. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771. For a discussion of how theories of corporate
identity inform debates about corporate social responsibility, see Petrin, supra note 47, at
22–26; Michael J. Philips, Corporate Moral Personhood and Three Conceptions of the
Corporation, 2 BUS. ETHICS Q. 435, 435–36 (1992).

2016]

SOCIAL BOUNDARIES OF CORPORATE TAXATION

2595

managers usurp the role of government by “in effect imposing taxes, on the
one hand, and deciding how the tax proceeds shall be spent, on the other.”77
Justice Stevens mobilized similar concepts in his minority opinion in
Citizens United, writing that corporate political speech “can impose a kind
of implicit tax” on shareholders by “effectively forc[ing] corporations to use
their shareholders’ money both to maintain access to, and to avoid
retribution from, elected officials.”78 Under this view, certain managerdriven corporate actions replicate the spending and taxing functions of
representative government.
If these types of corporate actions substitute for democratic decision
making on social issues, a corollary question is how such actions affect
corporations’ then-existing fiscal obligations to the state. As Mihir Desai
writes,
[I]ronically, managers have come to embrace corporate social
responsibility. Companies routinely tout their constructive role in society
and pour resources into social programs even as they pursue aggressive
tax strategies. Instead they should show their commitment to their
communities by treating their tax obligations as a responsibility
commensurate with, say, abiding by environmental regulations.79

Although corporations may have adopted corporate social responsibility
rhetoric and activities to advance their business interests rather than
pursuant to an altruistic motive, social understandings about corporations’
responsibilities to the state and the polity are necessarily linked to questions
about which entities should, or should not, be subject to corporate-level tax.
C. Two Objections
This section addresses two potential objections to using nontax legal or
social understandings in setting rules that determine the scope of the
corporate tax base, such as the check-the-box regulations. First, these
nontax legal or social understandings may introduce tax-expenditure
features into the Code, in that these understandings may justify deviations
from a normative or ideal corporate income tax base, taking the existence of
such a tax as a given.80 To the extent that tax expenditures obscure or
entrench social policy in ways that do not align with the polity’s
preferences, these types of deviations imply a breakdown in political

77. Friedman, supra note 74, at 33, 122. Friedman also believed that government’s role
in society should be relatively limited. See id.
78. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 468 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
79. Mihir A. Desai, A Better Way to Tax U.S. Businesses, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug.
2012, at 134, 139.
80. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives As a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 705–
06 (1970).
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economy and should be resisted.81 Resolving this objection, however,
would require the tax system to operate independently of corporate law and
social understandings about corporations, and implementing this degree of
separation would require fundamental reform, an option generally assumed
For example,
to be unavailable in the line-drawing literature.82
policymakers would need to abandon the longstanding norm that state-law
corporations are classified as corporations for tax purposes.83 To the extent
that corporate law and social understandings are embedded in the structural
distinction in tax law between corporations and conduits, these nontax legal
and social understandings should inform the construction of the corporate
tax base.
A second objection is that these nontax legal and social understandings
are simply misguided, and as such, policymakers should ignore them. For
example, theories of corporate identity, such as the real entity theory, may
be unjustifiable, and adhering to these flawed theories when defining the
corporate tax base may perpetuate the fiscal illusion that corporate entities,
rather than human beings, bear the burden of taxation.84 In this case,
aligning tax law with inapposite corporate-law values could have
deleterious effects by essentially compounding one mistake in corporate
law with a second error in taxation. For social understandings, individuals’
subjective beliefs about the tax system also may be wrong.85 Although
individuals may not comply with a tax system that either fails to meet their
expectations or appears unfair to them, it is not clear that policymakers
should defer to these incorrect beliefs when making decisions, rather than
simply enacting the objectively best policy.86 These types of incongruities,
however, can indicate places where tax law is misaligned with other areas
of law or social norms and may signal opportunities for incremental
improvements in outcomes, assuming that fundamental reform is
unavailable. In addition, social understandings may offer a way to resolve
policy questions in situations where economic factors, such as incidence or
net efficiency consequences, are uncertain or unclear. Finally, democratic

81. See id. at 722, 731–32. For a critical analysis of this perspective, see Boris I. Bittker,
A “Comprehensive Tax Base” As a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925,
926–28 (1967).
82. See Weisbach, supra note 12, at 895. Outside of relatively extraordinary
circumstances, fundamental reform may not be available even to Congress. See supra note
12.
83. See Field, supra note 12, at 505–08 (“[A]ttempts to justify mandatory corporate
taxation for incorporated entities have been largely unsuccessful.”); cf. Bittker, supra note
81, at 980–81 (“[A]chiev[ing] a truly ‘comprehensive’ base would require many more
fundamental changes in existing law than are usually acknowledged.”).
84. See supra Part II.A.
85. See supra Part II.A.
86. See Dean, Attractive Complexity, supra note 43, at 418 (discussing “the confidence
of the ‘common man’ in the fairness of the tax law”); see also Noël B. Cunningham &
Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 368–70
(1993) (discussing “perceptional equity”).
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values or other primary norms may support relying on such social
understandings, even if they are misguided.
III. THREE VIGNETTES
The contours of corporate taxation have implications beyond current
debates about corporate personhood. This part presents three vignettes of
specific features of corporate tax law that engage normative questions about
which business operations should be subject to corporate tax. In each of
these vignettes, an efficiency-type analysis, where close substitutes are
taxed the same, produces ambiguous or potentially undesirable results. All
three vignettes implicate questions of which entities should be included in
the corporate tax base—that is, they engage the Code’s entity classification
system beyond the boundaries of the check-the-box regulations and the
scholarship on those regulations. These vignettes are intended to challenge
the primacy of efficiency in setting entity classification rules for tax
purposes and to illustrate the relevance of nontax legal considerations and
social understandings in resolving these rules.
A. Small Businesses and S Corporations
In 1958, Congress enacted subchapter S of the Code, which permits
certain closely held state-law corporations to elect out of federal corporate
taxation and into a conduit regime.87 The stated purpose of subchapter S
was to “permit[] businesses to select the form of business organization
desired, without the necessity of taking into account major differences in
Originally intended to complement rules that
tax consequence.”88
permitted sole proprietorships to be taxed as corporations, only the election
out of the corporate tax base survived the Technical Amendments Act of
1958.89 An election under subchapter S favored individuals who owned
closely held corporations (at the time, limited to ten shareholders) and who,
for example, faced marginal tax rates close to or below the corporate tax
rate (generally, not the highest earners).90
Although the S corporation rules ostensibly decoupled corporate law
considerations from tax effects, the S corporation regime arguably
functioned less to ameliorate choice-of-entity distortions and more to

87. The S corporation conduit regime is not the same as the partnership conduit regime.
See I.R.C. §§ 1361–1379 (2012).
88. See S. REP. NO. 85-1983, at 87 (1958).
89. In 1954, the Senate passed rules similar to subchapter S, which the House rejected.
See id. (discussing a proposed subchapter R). Congress did pass the complementary
provision that allowed elections into the corporate tax base, apparently to provide specific
relief to a small number of taxpayers who desired the provision. This second provision was
repealed in 1958. See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, When American Small Business Hit the Jackpot:
Taxes, Politics and the History of Organizational Choice in the 1950s, 6 PITT. TAX. REV. 1,
33 n.211 (2008).
90. See S. REP. NO. 85-1983, at 87 (citing a corporate rate of 52 percent). At the time,
individual rates ranged from 20 to 91 percent. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 89, at 10.
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In the 1950s, clear corporate and
subsidize small businesses.91
noncorporate sectors existed. Agriculture, real estate, and miscellaneous
repair services operated through state-law partnerships, while all other
industries almost uniformly employed state-law corporations to do
Under these facts, choice-of-entity considerations were
business.92
substantially inelastic with respect to tax rates, and corporate taxation had
limited effect on whether particular businesses organized as state-law
corporations or partnerships.93 Furthermore, Congress enacted subchapter
S in the context of broader federal efforts to aid small businesses in
acquiring financing and competing with larger concerns.94 From this
perspective, subchapter S initially operated as a targeted subsidy to certain
small businesses owned by certain middle-income individuals. In effect,
subchapter S permitted an elective rate reduction for these small businesses
that purportedly would reduce the number of small business failures and
increase the tax system’s overall progressivity.95
In 1982, Congress overhauled the S corporation provisions.96 This
overhaul relaxed the eligibility requirements for S corporation status and
aligned the S corporation conduit regime more closely with the partnership
conduit rules under subchapter K.97 The effect was significant: the number
of S corporation returns filed increased eightfold between 1982 and 2012,
and the share of corporate tax returns that belonged to S corporations
increased from 20 percent to more than 70 percent.98 This period also
spanned the height of effective electivity for entity classification, as well as
the advent of the check-the-box rules.99 After 1982, the S corporation rules

91. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 89, at 3.
92. See Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL.
ECON. 215, 216–17, 230–31 (1962) (noting, however, “a fringe of unincorporated
enterprises” in some industries). This analysis sets aside personal service corporations, the
treatment of which was unsettled when Congress enacted subchapter S. See J. Timothy
Philipps et al., Origins of Tax Law: The History of the Personal Service Corporation, 40
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 433, 441–42 (1983).
93. This proposition is central to the Old Harberger model of corporate tax incidence
and arises out of empirical observations of the period. See SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 62–65.
94. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 89, at 18 (discussing the Small Business Administration
and government contracts); Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Why Is Small Business the Chief Business of
Congress?, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 4–5 (2011) (discussing the Small Business Investment
Company, a financing entity).
95. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 89, at 52–53.
96. Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
97. See SAMUEL P. STARR ET AL., S CORPORATIONS: FORMATION AND TERMINATION, pt.
I.B.2, BNA (Tax Management Portfolio 730-3d, database updated 2016).
98. Although the share of corporate gross receipts earned by S corporations also
increased over this time period, such receipts are less than one-third as large as the receipts
attributable to C corporations (22 percent compared to 76 percent). See SOI Tax Stats—
Integrated Business Data, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Integrated-BusinessData (last updated Apr. 15, 2015) (providing selected financial data on businesses from 1980
to 2012 in Table 1) [http://perma.cc/C9RQ-6UJP].
99. See supra Part I.
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functioned less as a targeted subsidy and more as part of a larger trend that
favored decoupling state-law entities and their tax classifications.
This history complicates understandings of the S corporation rules under
a line-drawing analysis. If partnerships and closely held corporations are
close substitutes, then homogenizing their tax treatment makes sense from
an efficiency perspective. This rationale, however, is inconsistent with the
subsidy function of the original S corporation rules, which attempted to
lower average rates on small businesses and supported increased
progressivity.
In addition, the administrative costs and arbitrage
opportunities inherent in maintaining parallel conduit regimes undercut a
line-drawing analysis based on efficiency considerations.100 Underlying
social understandings about the value of small businesses, whether correct
or misguided, may tip the balance in favor of maintaining a dual regime.
B. Real Estate Ownership and REITs
A second vignette, which again challenges a strict efficiency approach to
the corporate/conduit divide, analyzes the rules governing REITs. The
REIT rules allow state-law entities with passive real estate activities and
diffuse ownership to elect into a special conduit regime.101 Congress
enacted the REIT provisions in 1960, at a time when owners typically
formed state-law limited partnerships to conduct real estate activities.102
Generally, only wealthy or well-connected investors could access these real
estate partnerships.103 In creating the REIT regime, Congress addressed
several concerns, including the lack of parity between large investors and
small investors with respect to real estate, the disparate tax treatment of
regulated investments companies (RICs) such as mutual funds compared to
similar vehicles for real estate, and the availability of capital to the real
estate sector.104 At the same time, policymakers worked to preserve
classical corporate taxation for so-called “active” businesses, even if those
businesses involved significant real estate.105
Since Congress created REITs as an exception to corporate tax treatment,
REITs have grown significantly in scope and importance within the
financial system, a change fueled by legislative and administrative actions

100. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, REVIEW OF SELECTED ENTITY
CLASSIFICATION AND PARTNERSHIP TAX ISSUES 23–25 (1997), http://www.jct.gov/s-6-97.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8LMD-LS3M].
101. See I.R.C. §§ 856–860 (2012); see also Bradley T. Borden, Reforming REIT
Taxation (or Not), 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 47–48 (2015) (comparing the REIT conduit regime to
partnership taxation).
102. See Harberger, supra note 92, at 216 (noting that, of the total return of taxes to
capital in the private sector in the 1950s, two industries accounted for 80 percent of the
noncorporate profits—agriculture and real estate, in which corporate profits were negligible).
103. See PETER M. FASS ET AL., REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS HANDBOOK: A PASSTHROUGH ENTITY TO MAKE MORTGAGE LOANS AND OPERATE REAL ESTATE § 1:7, Westlaw
(database updated 2015).
104. See Borden, supra note 101, at 13–21.
105. See id. at 19–20, 60.
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as well as market-driven legal innovations.106 Justifications for (or
rationalizations of) these changes generally have looked to the original
purposes of the REIT regime. For example, commentators defend the rules
relaxing the types of services that REITs could provide (that is, how
“active” they could be) because the new rules “appropriately made REITs
more similar to limited partnerships.”107 In addition, less restrictive rules to
facilitate REIT ownership by pension plans have been characterized as
consistent with efforts to democratize and encourage investment in real
estate.108 From this perspective, expansions of the REIT regime advance
the social goals of the original legislation.
Critics of these changes argue that expanded REIT rules vitiate the
corporate tax base by allowing largely active businesses to divert earnings
to the REIT conduit regime.109 Recent concerns have crystalized around
two issues: the definition of “real property” for REIT purposes and tax-free
spin-offs involving an existing active business and a newly formed REIT.
Starting in the late 1960s, the IRS issued a series of increasingly permissive
rulings that allowed REITs to apply nontraditional real estate assets—from
railroad tracks to mobile homes to certain on-site energy generation
systems—toward certain REIT qualification requirements. This practice
accelerated in the 2000s, as the IRS issued rulings that gave favorable
treatment under the REIT rules to distribution systems and pipelines,
communication towers, data centers, and billboards; simultaneously, critics
lamented these rulings’ effects on the corporate tax base.110 Similarly,
critics have highlighted the negative effects on the corporate tax base of taxfree spin-offs in which one of the resulting companies elects REIT status
and leases its real estate assets back to the other resulting company.111
These spin-offs effectively permit integrated operating companies to
separate their real estate assets into a tax-advantaged vehicle. Congress
essentially foreclosed these types of spinoffs by legislation in December
2015.112
An efficiency analysis does little to clarify debates over the REIT
regime’s expansion. REITs can be publicly traded or privately held.113
Under an approach analogous to the current check-the-box regulations,
public trading represents a possible line by which to classify REITs as
106. See id. at 21. See generally Peter E. Boos, Runaway REIT Train?: Impact of Recent
IRS Rulings, 144 TAX NOTES 1289, 1290–92 (2014) (discussing the history of REITs);
Borden, supra note 101, at 32–55 (summarizing changes since 1986).
107. See Borden, supra note 101, at 37.
108. See id. at 42–45.
109. See id. at 3–4 (discussing news coverage and the 2014 Camp Plan). But see id. at 57
(arguing that “bad optics, more than bad policy,” led to these criticisms).
110. See Boos, supra note 106, at 1294–98; Borden, supra note 101, at 52–53.
111. See Borden, supra note 101, at 52.
112. See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, CONGRESS ENACTS SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE
REIT AND FIRPTA RULES 1 (2015), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-congressreit-firpta-rules [http://perma.cc/B4QV-2CH8].
113. See FASS ET AL., supra note 103, § 1:81 (describing various ways to satisfy the REIT
ownership tests).
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corporations or conduits. Also relevant to the REIT rules, however, are two
other close substitutes: real estate partnerships, which are conventional
vehicles for investment in real estate, and RICs, which facilitate passive,
diversified investments by small holders of capital. Indeed, the tensions
between these two substitutes better explain current debates about the REIT
regime’s scope, which generally focus on parity between REITs and either
real estate partnerships or RICs.114 The choice between these two
substitutes—and corporate or conduit taxation—depends on the social goals
at stake. In this way, a broader look at the social understandings and
critiques of REITs, rather than a pure efficiency analysis, may help inform
the appropriate framework for REIT taxation.
C. Corporate Residence and Inversions
The final vignette explores line drawing in the taxation of international
business activities through the lens of corporate residence and inversions.
The United States, which taxes domestic corporations on their worldwide
income, defines corporate residence as the jurisdiction where a corporation
is “created or organized.”115 By contrast, many non-U.S. legal systems
impose tax on resident corporations only with respect to their business
income arising in that jurisdiction (known as “territorial” taxation), with
residence determined under a multifactor test that examines, for example, a
corporation’s management or operations.116 Together, these disparate tax
rules produce an incentive for corporations incorporated in the United
States to migrate to or be acquired by an entity organized in a non-U.S.
jurisdiction—a type of transaction known colloquially as a corporate
expatriation or corporate inversion.117
A central benefit of inversions is that they enable U.S.-incorporated
multinationals to achieve a sort of “self-help” territorial taxation, in which
the expatriating entity faces U.S. tax only on income from its U.S.
operations.118 Multinationals can amplify this effect through “earnings
114. See Borden, supra note 101, at 62–67 (describing this issue as an “inequity
conundrum”).
115. See I.R.C. §§ 11, 7701(a)(4) (2012). The United States credits certain foreign
income taxes paid against corporations’ domestic tax liabilities. See id. §§ 901, 902.
116. These rules mean that a corporation may be incorporated in a high-tax non-U.S.
country but be “resident” for non-U.S. tax purposes in a low-tax country (a “tax haven”). See
DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 32–33 (2014); Cathy Hwang,
The New Corporate Migration: Tax Diversion Through Inversion, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 807,
813–14, 833 (2015).
117. In their ideal form, these transactions involve minimal effects on operations and
ownership. See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, CORPORATE INVERSION
TRANSACTIONS: TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS 1–2 (2002), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/
default/files/microsites/millstein-center/panel_1_001_office_to_tax_policy.pdf [http://perma.
cc/KHJ2-Z3RC]. For reasons discussed below, current law generally precludes inversions in
their ideal form.
118. See id. at 29; see also N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON OUTBOUND
INVERSION TRANSACTIONS 22 (2002), http://old.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders20/Tax
LawSection/TaxReports/1014report.pdf (describing post-inversion taxation as on “a de facto
‘territorial’ basis”) [http://perma.cc/9CQP-NH3Z].
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stripping” payments from U.S. entities to non-U.S. entities, aggressive
intercompany pricing, and careful allocations of the multinational group’s
interest expense, all of which can shift additional taxable income outside
the U.S. corporate tax base.119 In practice, however, multinationals can
attain virtual territoriality through tax planning without undertaking an
inversion. This alternative type of self-help territoriality relies on the fact
that U.S.-incorporated multinationals generally are not taxed on income
earned by non-U.S. corporate subsidiaries until that income is repatriated to
the United States as a dividend or similar payment, a concept sometimes
referred to simply as “deferral.”120 These multinationals either never
repatriate this non-U.S. income or gain access to the non-U.S. income in
ways that do not trigger U.S. tax inclusions. According to Michael Graetz,
“[I]n the case of corporations, we should probably stop talking as if our
policy is worldwide taxation of corporate residents and as if any departure
from such policy, such as taxing active business income of foreign
corporations only when repatriated, is an aberration.”121 As applied, U.S.
tax law occupies a space between worldwide and territorial taxation.
Various provisions in the Code and Treasury regulations attempt to deter
inversions.122 Among these provisions is section 7874, which qualifies the
general rules governing corporate residence.123 If a U.S.-incorporated
multinational undertakes an inversion, and the multinational’s pre-inversion
shareholders own 80 percent or more of the post-inversion foreign parent
company, then section 7874 effectively disregards the inversion, and the
multinational’s post-inversion parent company is treated as a domestic
corporation for U.S. income tax purposes unless the multinational has
“substantial business activities” in the relevant foreign jurisdiction.124
Currently, inversions typically avoid the 80 percent threshold by partnering
with an existing foreign corporation that is organized in a low-tax
119. Interest stripping is policed, in part, by I.R.C. § 163(j) (2012), and earnings stripping
using rents, royalties, or service fees is scrutinized under I.R.C. § 482. The extent to which
inversions’ tax benefits stem from these strategies is contested. Compare Michael S. Kirsch,
The Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The Tension Between Symbols
and Substance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 475, 502–03
(2005) (very important), with Andrew Velarde, Treasury Sees Tougher Inversion Problems
than Interest Stripping, TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.taxnotes.com/taxnotes-today/cross-border-mergers-and-acquisitions/treasury-sees-tougher-inversionproblems-interest-stripping/2016/02/16/18239596 (less important) [http://perma.cc/K4LGDN5N].
120. Subpart F of the Code sets limitations on this type of deferral. See I.R.C. §§ 951–
965.
121. Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 323 (2001).
122. See I.R.C. §§ 1248(i), 4985; Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(c) (as amended in 2015) (the
“Helen of Troy” regulations).
123. For another anti-inversion provision that addresses corporate residence, see I.R.C.
§ 269B (treating a foreign corporation and a U.S. corporation whose stock are “stapled”—
unable to be traded independently—as a single U.S. corporation).
124. I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2), (b). The threshold for “substantial business activities” is
relatively high. See I.R.S. Notice 2015-79, 2015-49 I.R.B. 775 (stating Treasury’s intent to
issue regulations tightening the “substantial business activities” exception).
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jurisdiction such as Ireland or Switzerland.125 This type of “inversion
‘lite’” mimics an economically motivated “real” acquisition.126
Fundamentally, the policy question raised by inversions involves the
scope of the U.S. corporate tax base. The law must distinguish domestic
entities subject to U.S. corporate taxation on their worldwide income from
foreign entities that do not face this regime.127 The decision about where to
incorporate, the touchstone of the U.S. corporate residence rules under the
Code, is relatively (and increasingly) elastic, at least for some taxpayers.128
For example, multinationals may be able to draw on contract law,
innovations in local corporate law, or increasingly complete financial
markets to “replicate the benefits of Delaware incorporation without
actually selecting it.”129 This flexibility indicates that, from an efficiency
perspective, inversions present a line-drawing problem for which
policymakers should group close substitutes, assuming the unavailability of
fundamental reform.130
Identifying the relevant close substitutes, however, is challenging
because inversions implicate multiple axes of comparison. Incorporation
outside the United States may be a close substitute for U.S.
incorporation,131 self-help territoriality through deferral may be a close
substitute for self-help territoriality through inversions,132 and “real” crossborder acquisitions may be close substitutes for inversions.133 Furthermore,
the availability of these substitutes may vary across industries or sectors in
125. See Hwang, supra note 116, at 831–37; see also I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-52
I.R.B. 712, § 2 (stating Treasury’s intent to issue regulations addressing transactions to tailor
companies’ size to avoid I.R.C. § 7874).
126. See generally Lewis J. Greenwald & David H. Kaplan, Inversions “Lite”: Finding
“Substantial Business Activity” Under the New U.S. Regs, 43 TAX NOTES INT’L 515 (2006);
Lee A. Sheppard, Challenging Unwritten Inversion Regulations, TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb.
17, 2016), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/cross-border-mergers-and-acquisitions/
news-analysis-challenging-unwritten-inversion-regulations/2016/02/17/18242816
(describing I.R.C. § 7874 as “a weak statute”) [http://perma.cc/ZJ3J-LRWX].
127. Entities incorporated outside the United States remain subject to tax, including a
substitute entity-level tax (the “branch profits tax”), on income that arises in, or is effectively
connected to, the United States. For the relevant Code provisions, see I.R.C. §§ 881, 882,
884; tax treaties follow a similar framework.
128. See Eric J. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory
Competition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1652 (2015) (“America’s traditional market power in
regulatory competition has begun to slip.”); see also SHAVIRO, supra note 116, at 67–70
(elaborating on factors that influence the elasticity of tax residence).
129. SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 143; see also Kane & Rock, supra note 8, at 1265–69
(arguing that, although U.S. corporations “los[t] some value simply because they became
subject to a different regime of [non-U.S.] corporate law,” this loss was mitigated by the
quasi-regulatory listing requirements of the New York Stock Exchange).
130. In addition to grouping close substitutes, policymakers generally should disfavor
corporate taxation. See supra Part I.
131. For discussions of various differences in U.S. and non-U.S. corporate law, see
Hwang, supra note 116, at 838–42; Talley, supra note 128, at 1690–700.
132. Inversions and deferral probably are not perfect substitutes because inversions may
facilitate more earnings stripping than deferral.
133. These types of combinations, however, may have costs. See Hwang, supra note 116,
at 844–45.

2604

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

the economy, complicating an efficiency analysis.134 Although each of
these three axes likely favors a rule less stringent than current law, the
precise contours of a rule that maximizes efficiency across all three axes
depends on how these axes interact in producing overall efficiency, as well
as the relative normative weights given to each axis.135 The answer to the
former question may be difficult or impossible for policymakers to
determine, and the answer to the latter question may fall outside of
particular policymakers’ expertise.136
Nontax legal regimes and social understandings about inversions may
illuminate these policy decisions in a different way. Implicit in efficiencyoriented reforms such as the check-the-box regulations is that policymakers
should separately consider tax policy and corporate law, but doing so may
have deleterious systemic effects. For example, Eric Talley argues that
“severing the link completely” between corporate and tax law may cause
“the variety and quality of corporate governance regimes worldwide [to]
atrophy.”137 In addition, to the extent that U.S. public policy is intertwined
with the success and failure of companies with substantial ties to the United
States, inversions may result in nontax harms.138
Finally, the public and political rhetoric surrounding inversions means
that these transactions—and their policing—have significant social
meaning. For example, in response to the proposed inversion of Stanley
Works in 2002, Senator Chuck Grassley, at the time the ranking Republican
on the Senate Finance Committee, said: “These expatriations aren’t illegal.
But they’re sure immoral. During a war on terrorism, coming out of a
recession, everyone ought to be pulling together. If companies don’t have
their hearts in America, they ought to get out.”139 Stanley Works’s
shareholders approved the reincorporation shortly after Grassley’s
comments, but the company’s board “threw out the results the next day” in
These social
response to public and governmental pressure.140
understandings not only influence multinationals’ behavior and the

134. See id. at 846–48, 850–51.
135. For example, if multiple lines lead to identical efficiency results, policymakers
should consider other normative factors in setting policy. But see Weisbach, supra note 4, at
1675–76 (arguing that local improvements in efficiency should control where policymakers’
ability to draw lines is constrained).
136. See supra Part I.
137. See Talley, supra note 128, at 1653–54.
138. See Hwang, supra note 116, at 842–44.
139. Press Release, Chuck Grassley, Grassley Announces Bill to Rein in Corporate
Expatriation (Apr. 11, 2002), http://www.finance.senate.gov/ranking-members-news/
grassley-announces-bill-to-rein-in-corporate-expatriation [http://perma.cc/XN5D-82SR].
140. See David Cay Johnston, Stanley Works Backs Away from a Move to Avoid Taxes,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/02/business/stanley-worksbacks-away-from-a-move-to-avoid-taxes.html [http://perma.cc/KX5G-VSYM]. On the day
after the shareholder vote, two state officials sued Stanley Works, and investigators from the
Securities and Exchange Commission contacted the company. Union leaders also accused
Stanley Works’s CEO of “stealing the election”—that is, the shareholder referendum. In
August 2002, Stanley Works abandoned its inversion attempt entirely. Id.
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elasticity of corporate residence, but they also indicate ways in which tax
policy can be aligned with democratic or popular sentiment.141
CONCLUSION
In addressing which entities should face the corporate tax, commentators
generally have looked to efficiency considerations as the principal metric by
which to gauge the success or failure of the law. This is particularly true
with respect to the check-the-box regulations. This turn to efficiency,
however, downplays the fact that corporate taxation—a structural feature of
the Code—intersects with other, nontax legal regimes, as well as social
understandings about corporations’ personhood, rights, and responsibilities.
For this reason, this Article contends that the appropriate line between
corporate and conduit entities for tax purposes depends not only on whether
such distinctions are efficient but also on the valence of each category in
nontax legal and social contexts. More generally, even structural aspects of
the Code must be understood within larger legal and social contexts, and the
precise ways in which these legal and social contexts implicate the
boundaries of corporate taxation warrant further exploration.
This contention has two broader implications. First, non-tax legal and
social understandings are interwoven with the tax system, and this fact
provides a possible answer for why policymakers, including Congress,
rarely implement tax reforms that advance efficiency by eliminating linedrawing problems.142 For example, among tax scholars, a substantial
consensus opposes “meaningless distinctions” such as classical corporate
taxation, which requires delineation of corporate and conduit entities for tax
purposes, and the debt/equity distinction, which entails the differentiation of
equity investors from lenders to a business.143 Such lines may be
inconvenient from a tax perspective but critically important from a nontax
legal perspective; alternatively, the social meaning of these distinctions may
be important.144
In addition, the heterogeneity of nontax legal and social understandings
suggests that the strict binary choices characteristic of line-drawing
questions may be incomplete. Indeed, while the check-the-box regulations
typically address a choice between corporate (subchapter C) and partnership
(subchapter K) tax treatment, a fuller picture of the corporate tax base
includes conduits such as S corporations (subchapter S) and REITs
(subchapter M), as well as nonprofits and foreign corporations not subject

141. For a discussion of the potential value of such sentiment, see supra Part II.C.
142. See supra note 12.
143. Many of these “meaningless distinctions” are best characterized as structural. See
Weisbach, supra note 4, at 1637–43; see also SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 48–52 (discussing
“pillars of sand”); Schlunk, supra note 10, at 861 (“[T]he most robust approach is simply to
eliminate the inconsistent tax treatment of the existing items.”).
144. For example, the social implications of debt may differ from those of equity, and
these social implications may change over time. See generally BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC
OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2002).
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to U.S. tax at the entity level.145 Each of these regimes operates according
to different rules and with varying effects. Taken together, these regimes
imply that future policy choices involving entity classification for tax
purposes need not reside within the narrow constraints of the current checkthe-box rules.146

145. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2006); see also supra Part III.
146. For a similar rejection of all-or-nothing approaches in the international tax context,
see SHAVIRO, supra note 116, at 187–90.

